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Abstract 
This paper will analyse the transparency, impartiality and objectiveness of the European Union’s (EU) pre-
accession assessment procedure. The principal aim is to test and analyse whether the EU follows oﬃ  cial 
and objective criteria in its progress reports or if is it dominated by institutional and national interests. 
The central questions of the paper are: What were the main motivators of the EU’s independent closed 
assessment system for the pre-accession process and what inﬂ uence did this have on the accession 
process during the years 2004–2006?
To answer these questions, the paper will compare the European Commission’s (Commission) progress 
reports on selected candidate countries with the assessments of six other respected research centres: 
the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, Freedom House, the Bertelsmann Foundation, Trans-
parency International, Fraser Institute and the Heritage Foundation. If the evaluation results of the EU 
diﬀ er signiﬁ cantly or systematically from the calculated average of the other evaluators, then there 
is a need to analyse the methods, logic and motivation of the European Commission during the pre-
accession evaluation, as there is a possibility of subjectivity and politicised evaluation.
This analysis covers the main areas of the Copenhagen Criteria. The test cases will be pre-accession 
progress assessments of Bulgaria, Croatia, FYROM and Romania in 2004–2006. Test areas will consist 
of: Governance eﬃ  ciency; Existence and quality of rule of law; Level of corruption and eﬃ  ciency of anti-
corruption activities; Eﬃ  ciency of legal system, and Economic liberties and freedoms.
Keywords: European Union, enlargement, conditionality, evaluation.
Introduction
The 5th enlargement of the European Union, which was unique in many respects, starting from the 
magnitude of the accession and its political importance, was also the ﬁ rst enlargement of the EU to 
contain a list of accession criteria known as the Copenhagen Criteria and a administrative system of 
conditionality to support criteria fulﬁ lment and a regular progress assessment.
What had earlier been an overwhelmingly political process of pre-accession negotiations (even 
when not admitted openly) was gradually replaced with a technical system of conditions, measurable 
criteria and assessment. The European Commission’s oﬃ  cial aim was to provide a transparent and 
competitive environment for candidate states during the whole pre-accession period. It was also 
clearly stated in the 1993 Copenhagen Council’s conclusions and the ‘White Paper on Enlargement’ 
that possible acceptance in the upcoming enlargement conditionality is clearly connected with the 
progress shown in the fulﬁ lment of accession criteria.
The Copenhagen Criteria and the supportive conditionality were oﬃ  cially introduced as a fair and 
open way to compete for EU membership, obtain practical feedback and ﬁ nally fulﬁ l the criteria in 
the most eﬀ ective way. Applicant countries were encouraged to open their economies and societies 
in an unprecedented way in exchange for a fast and supervised accession process. EU institutions and 
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member states alike emphasised that only a joint and transparent eﬀ ort, where both sides trusted 
each other, was the fastest and the most eﬀ ective enlargement strategy. The EU used both the ‘carrot’ 
of possible membership and the ‘stick’ of exclusion, to drive economic and political reforms in the 
candidate countries. Each applicant country was oﬀ ered membership when it fully complied with the 
Copenhagen Criteria (Copenhagen Council Conclusions 2003).
On the other hand, critics claimed that by establishing the Copenhagen Criteria, the EU went 
only half way towards transparency and functionality—the criteria were not quantitative or clearly 
measurable, they were not ﬁ xed for the whole period of enlargement, they were not measured by an 
impartial body, and assessments tended to include additional categories outside the oﬃ  cial criteria. 
In a situation where most of these shortcomings were caused not by a lack of technical ability, but 
mainly political choice, the question of the functional purpose and objectivity of the accession criteria 
was raised (for example Anastasakis & Bechev 2003).
But why did the EU need to create an entirely new assessment system, when most components 
of the Copenhagen Criteria were simultaneously regularly and impartially measured by several 
inter national organisations and agencies? The two most logical answers might be: a) deeper, more 
sophisticated and quantitative research was needed; and b) there was a need for adjusted results. 
Important questions are also how and why objective assessment, transparency and trust are 
important for the eﬃ  ciency of the conditionality during the pre-accession process, and what the prior 
motivation is of the European Commission as an evaluator?
Sceptical analysts have pointed out the possibility that the accession criteria were established in 
a ‘semi-quantitative’ way to control the speed and cost of the pre-accession process from the EU side 
instead of supporting actual progress-based accession. Some criticism has also been based on the fact 
that strict criteria and evaluation did not seem important in previous enlargements.
The following paper will focus on one of the central aspects of the pre-accession process: the 
actual measuring and assessment of candidate states’ progress in order to analyse the connection 
between the progress in the ﬁ elds of the Copenhagen Criteria and their inﬂ uence on actual member-
ship prospects. To put it in a nutshell, the questions What were the main motivators of the EU 
evaluation system’s design and what was its actual inﬂ uence in practice during the 2004–2006 pre-accession 
assessments? will be the main questions to be answered in the following paper.
The paper will also analyse what role conditionality plays in pre-accession logic—was it a function 
and eﬃ  ciency creation tool, or a control and manipulation tool?
The following analysis will be based on the pre-accession assessment cases of Bulgaria, Croatia, 
FYROM and Romania during their joint candidate status years in 2004–2006. The applicant states were 
selected on the basis of similarity in regional, historical and cultural aspects, in many ways comparable 
but clearly chosen in a way that some of them should be accepted by the EU and some not during the 
years following the observation period. Comparison will be as quantitative as possible, to highlight 
the possible diﬀ erence of the EU’s and other evaluators’ results. The main method of analysing the 
evaluation’s objectivity and connection between progress and assessments will be a comparison of the 
EU Progress Report results with the results of other main evaluators in this ﬁ eld. The EU assessment 
results of the EU will be compared with assessments of the IMF, WB, the Bertelsmann Foundation, 
Transparency International, Freedom House, Fraser Institute and the Heritage Foundation. 
Categories to be compared in this paper will be: a) rule of law; b) level of corruption and eﬃ  ciency 
of anti-corruption activities; c) economic liberties and freedoms; d) governance eﬃ  ciency; and e) 
judicial eﬃ  ciency. 
These are areas where an evaluator can choose a qualitative or semi-quantitative way of 
assessment. By choosing a semi-quantitative approach, rankings and indices are the main components 
of evaluation. By choosing the qualitative option, the comments and opinions are the bases of a ﬁ nal 
decision. The European Commission has decided on a qualitative evaluation model, while most other 
independent evaluators have decided on a quantitative model.
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The methodology, criteria and test cases
The research is based on a functional and idealistic assumption that in order to serve the wider 
integration process goals, pre-accession assessments are aimed at reﬂ ecting candidate countries’ 
actual (measureable or recognisable) progress, as it provides a logical basis for assistance and creates 
competition for further progress. The assumption that objective evaluation is regarded as necessary 
is supported by the Commission’s statement, “Progress is measured on the basis of decisions taken, 
legislation adopted and measures implemented. This approach ensures equal treatment across all 
reports and permits an objective assessment” (European Commission 2006b: 5).
The logical starting point of the analysis is that if the European Commission and other international 
institutions are professionally and impartially evaluating the same criteria, in general, they should 
receive similar results. Or if the results diﬀ er slightly, in general, it is not systematic and does 
not purposely discriminate against any of the candidate states. There is, of course, an alternative 
critical view that EU assessments and reports are not only aimed at mirroring the actual progress 
of candidate states, but also at regulating the accession speed and conditions. Accordingly, if the 
European Commission’s Progress Report results do not match the results of impartial international 
evaluators, there is a need to research the core reasons, nature and motivation of this diﬀ erence. 
The EU Commission’s assessments of a candidate state’s progress will be taken as a reference 
point, and the data will be compared with the assessments of other international evaluators (at least 
four organisations in each criterion. Annual and Special Reports of the IMF, WB, the Bertelsmann 
Foundation, Transparency International, Freedom House and the Heritage Foundation will be used 
as sources of comparison. The evaluations of independent evaluators will be summarised and the 
average will be compared with the EC evaluations.). The wider the diﬀ erence between the EU and 
other evaluators is, the more evident the possible subjectivity of the EU assessment. As the second 
step, the logic of diﬀ erentiation will be analysed to ﬁ nd out if subjectivity is random or systematic in 
supporting some candidate states. It will be followed by a short motivation analysis.
The main criteria in data source selection are their quantitative nature and similarity with the 
EU evaluation categories. The reports also need to cover the whole reference period (2004–2006). No 
criteria that are by nature fully based on quantitative measuring (GDP growth, inﬂ ation, unemploy-
ment, budget deﬁ cit, public debt) are used, as these oﬀ er no possible option for subjectivity. 
Comparison categories are broadly based on the Copenhagen Criteria and more concretely on 
special categories described in candidate countries’ Progress Reports in 2005–2006. As Progress Reports 
are standardised, based on the accession treaty structure, all Commission reports consist of the same 
sub-chapter numeration (‘Rule of law’, for example, chapter 2.1).
The Copenhagen Criteria form also three general areas of evaluation. The ﬁ rst group of criteria 
covers democracy, rule of law, institutional stability, level of corruption and minority treatment. The 
second group of criteria covers: general level of market economy, ability to sustain in common market 
competition, economic liberties and defence of ownership. The third group of criteria covers the 
administrative ability of the harmonisation of EU laws and the ability to take further membership 
obligations (European Commission 1993, and European Commission 2006e: 22).
As the Copenhagen Criteria themselves are too general to be measured quantitatively, in practice, 
these are replaced by a modiﬁ ed list of criteria that is best represented in Progress Reports. Progress 
Report chapters include both the criteria, which have a direct connection to pre-accession (Copenhagen 
Criteria), and numerous sub-areas, which have a questionable connection with the original criteria: 
budgetary control, security and defence policy, public procurement, human rights, employment and 
social policy, etc. Most of the non-Copenhagen Criteria are ﬁ tted into a third part of the Progress 
Report (under the chapter ‘Ability to harmonise and adapt EU laws and obligations of membership’). 
The empirical part of the paper will analyse the following speciﬁ c criteria from the Progress Reports: 
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- Governance eﬃ  ciency: indicates the level of democracy, stable institutions and respect of minority 
rights (based on the 1st Copenhagen Criteria and located under chapters 2.1, 2.2, 5 and 22 in the 
Progress Reports).
- Rule of law (based on the 1st and 3rd Copenhagen Criteria and located under chapter 2.1 in the 
Progress Reports).
- Level of corruption and eﬃ  ciency of anti-corruption activities (based on the 1st Copenhagen Criteria 
and located under chapters 4.4, 4.5 and 5 in the Progress Reports).
- Economic liberties and freedoms (based on the 2nd Copenhagen Criteria and located under chapters 
3.1, 4.3 and 4.4 in the Progress Reports).
- Judicial eﬃ  ciency: actual ability of legal protection (based on the 2nd and 3rd Copenhagen Criteria 
and located under chapters 2.1, 4.6, 7 and 23 in the Progress Reports).
The comparison will only cover the ﬁ elds where the EU is using opinion-based assessment, but the 
other agencies are using quantitative measuring. These are the areas where quantitative measuring 
is technically possible and the other evaluators provide numeral evaluations, but the EU has chosen 
to prefer a non-measureable approach. An attractive and intriguing part, however, is that both the EU 
Commission and the independent evaluators oﬀ er the rankings of selected states and the magnitude 
of their diﬀ erence. The purpose of comparison is based on these rankings, to test the objectivity of the 
EU Commission’s evaluations. The second level of the analysis is to summarise which countries have 
received an advantage or discrimination in the scoreboard ranking from the European Commission. 
It is also important whether those advantages and discriminations actually played a role in the actual 
selection of which country is ready for membership.
The test cases are the pre-accession assessments of Bulgaria, Croatia, FYROM and Romania on the 
social economic and legal progress during their joint pre-accession period in 2004–2006. Selection was 
based on the criteria of comparing ‘as similar cases as possible’ among the applicant states, where 
all selected states shared a quite comparable socio-economic development level, cultural background 
and motivation for reforms to achieve EU membership.
The test period is limited due to practical reasons since Croatia joined the actual accession talks 
in 2005, and FYROM was also accepted as a candidate state in 2005; Bulgaria and Romania ended their 
pre-accession negotiations on EU accession on January 1st, 2007. All four were similarly evaluated by 
the EU Commission only during the years 2005–2006.
Theoretical logic of pre-accession conditionality and assessment
EU pre-accession and assessment analysis brings together two research frameworks: ﬁ rst, the positive 
conditionality paradigm and second, the accession and pre-accession logic of the EU. The traditional 
conditionality paradigm is dominated by models based on development cooperation studies; the most 
well-known among them is Tony Killick’s Aid and the Political Economy of Policy Change. While oﬀ ering 
a wide-range systematic overview of the evaluation methodology and eﬃ  ciency of multilateral 
donors in Africa, these approaches do not include critical variables of EU pre-accession: membership 
perspective and a far-developed level of integration (Killick 1998).
The theoretical logic of conditionality eﬃ  ciency has also been thoroughly researched by Paul 
Collier and his associates, but once again mainly in the cases of African states, where a starting 
situation initiates a diﬀ erent logic and actual tools from the EU pre-accession situation. The main 
similarity to the EU pre-accession process is the core logic of structural conditionality: a step-by-step 
model, positive motivation and tools to safeguard already achieved reforms (Collier 1997: 1401).
The conditionality analysis of Carlos Santiso focuses on governance eﬃ  ciency during the con di-
tionality based on the broader experience of the G8. In this case, the 5th and 6th enlargement rounds 
once again provide diﬀ erent results, which cannot be explained by a single logical model or connection 
(Santiso 2002).
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Traditional studies on EU enlargement oﬀ er the second part of the theoretical package for this 
paper. The motivation for enlargement as well as rules and practical results are seen diﬀ erently 
depending on the authors’ theoretical background. Jan Zielonka in his Europe as Empire; the Nature of 
the Enlarged European Union has oﬀ ered a broader philosophical view of the logic of the enlargement 
and post-enlargement situation through a neo-imperial prism. Zielonka’s questions of the applicants’ 
loyalty and the importance of the geographical location of candidate states will be taken into account 
in this paper as well. He focuses on the importance of voluntarism when forming the new European 
empire (Zielonka 2006: 53–56).
Most authors bring those two paradigms of conditionality and enlargement together. Heather 
Grabbe describes how third important concept- Europeanisation aﬀ ects CEE governance, when 
inﬂ uenced by conditionality, diﬀ usion and diversity. Grabbe oﬀ ers a specialised and focused approach, 
where a special empirical situation in the CEE is the source of new logic and models, instead of 
attempting to adapt already existing models for the latest EU accession cases (Grabbe 2001).
Mapping and deﬁ ning the main components and logic of EU conditionality towards candidate 
countries has been the main focus of Frank Schimmelfennig in his multiple joint writings with Ulrich 
Sedelmeier and Stefan Engert (‘Candidate Countries and Conditionality’, ‘Pre-accession Conditionality 
and Post-accession Compliance in the New Member States: A Research Note’). They also focus on the 
importance of constructed values like ‘community’, ‘identity’ and ‘solidarity’ during conditionality and 
on the accession process. Especially important are their guidelines on the eﬃ  ciency of conditionality, 
by proposing ‘soft, step-by step’ tactics instead of using force (Schimmelfennig 1999, Schimmelfennig 
& Sedelmeier 2007).
Karen E. Smith has added a dynamic aspect to pre-accession conditionality studies, by researching 
‘The Evolution and Application of EU Membership Conditionality’, which oﬀ ers some aspects of 
motivation explanations in this paper. She also describes and analyses how the relationship between 
imposers and address countries developed in mutual cooperation (Smith 2003).
To answer the central research question, it is important to start with the question of how and 
why objective assessment, transparency and trust, as a part of conditionality, are important for the 
eﬃ  ciency of the whole pre-accession process, and how these values serve the interests of existing 
member states, institutions and applicant countries.
Conditionality (and a criteria of success, as the main part of it) is a technical method to achieve 
cooperation eﬃ  ciency. Basically, conditionality should provide the playground for two or more actors 
for the most eﬃ  cient cooperation. The main question for the imposing side of the conditionality 
is how to motivate the target country to follow certain rules and achieve results in exchange for a 
reward (Killick 1998: 5). Asymmetry in a conditional relationship is quite unavoidable, as the receiving 
side (applicant country) is partly or fully dependent on the imposer’s assistance and rules (Fierro 2003: 
95). The system of conditionality and assessment needs to serve the eﬃ  ciency of the process and be 
as free of ideology as possible. 
The conditionality situation, which is often described as the ‘stick and carrot’ approach, oﬀ ers in 
practice several choices for the motivation: the ﬁ nal reward (membership for example), the temporary 
ﬁ nancial support and the nature of the relation (Smith 2003: 58, Zalewski 2004:  3-5). 
When looking at the conditionality and assessment logic in the context of EU integration theory, 
according to the dominant neo-functional paradigm, the fastest inclusion and progress will lead to 
the fastest actual convergence. In pre-accession logic, it means that a more motivated environment 
for both sides will lead to faster and more eﬀ ective accession, which serves the interests of both 
sides. Therefore, at least in theory, it would be reasonable for EU institutions to support transparent, 
guided and motivational enlargement conditions and assessment based on actual progress as widely 
as possible (Rosamond 2000). 
Where accession is the main reward, the rules of assessment and the nature of relationship play 
the central role. A more transparent system oﬀ ers more space and a clearer status for applicant states, 
and also motivates them more as the ﬁ nal decision actually depends on their pre-accession progress. 
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It seems to be a win-win situation for all those around the pre-accession table. In the 5th and 6th 
enlargements, the main motivation to fulﬁ l the accession criteria was based on proof and the hope 
that progress really mattered and that the assessment was fair, so there was no rational need to look 
for political support, but only a need for faster progress. Quite often it was just based on an idealist 
hope that the EU and the West in general and contrary to the habits of the former Soviet Union, were 
based on fairness and progress. 
The accepted and rejected countries alike have later underlined the importance of a clear promise 
of accession if the Copenhagen Criteria are met. The conditional framework oﬀ ered by the EU was 
seen as a solution to achieving a quick transition from the previous regime to a liberal capitalist 
system. The nature and purpose of conditionality in practice was questioned mainly only in academic 
writings or post-rejection announcements from Bulgaria and Romania (Anastasakis & Bechev 2003: 
5-6). The central question remained practical—how to bring conditionality eﬃ  ciency into practice? 
The utilitarian argument has been the second most important motivator for candidate countries: at 
ﬁ rst based on the promise of donors to cover up to 80% of necessary costs for reform implementation, 
later also providing some additional reward resources for social and institutional reforms. Therefore, 
the EU-related activities became priorities that helped to solve the local problems and to compensate 
the lack of ﬁ nance within state budgets. Public support was also often gained by the joint argument 
that all the eﬀ orts would be later compensated through a higher standard of living. The belief in 
European values also legitimised the process of harmonisation without adaption. Even when the 
candidate countries did not understand the purpose of every legal act, there was a strong belief that 
it was a need to gain welfare (Sjursen 2002: 495). As long as the candidate countries believed that the 
accession process was open, transparent and objective, it remained popular among the candidate 
countries’ political elite and public opinion. Critique was provided mainly after the rejection of 
Romania and Bulgaria from the 2004 enlargement, where both state-based and independent Balkan 
analysts started to debate the logic and motivation of the pre-accession conditionality (Anastasakis & 
Bechev 2003: 5). Also the content of the criteria and the growing nature of the Progress Reports’ ﬁ elds 
were not seen as problematic as long as they were supported by a clear promise of accession.
In the 1990s and less after the millennium, the utilitarian view was counterbalanced by morality and 
the idea of equality. Ethical and moral explanations were based on Webberian administration ideals, 
protestant ethics and the idea of the historical guilt of Germany in relation to the CEE. Accordingly, 
the CEE countries deserve an equal chance to join the EU, despite their weaknesses after the regime 
transition. The role of existing member states should be supportive, not dominant or discriminative. 
Enlargement is not a technical process with demands on one side and funding on the other side, but 
it is based on the equal treatment of states and compensating historical injustice (Sjursen 2002: 494). 
The logic was based on the assumption that in case of enlargement conditions the question was not 
only the eﬃ  ciency of the process but also its legitimacy and message to society.
On the one hand, a clear motivating system seemed the simplest and most ethical, and on 
the other hand it oﬀ ered almost no control over the speed and conditions of the enlargement. A 
completely qualitative or politicized system on the other hand would have been de-motivating for 
candidate states and would direct their eﬀ orts to political negotiation, not to the actual process of 
modernisation. The decision for a more ﬂ exible and semi-quantitative system was introduced, and 
surprisingly most applicant countries did not raise any counter-arguments to the non-quantitative 
assessment, leaving them to complete dependence on the European Commission’s opinion, while 
the Commission itself was one of the interested actors in the accession process. This is close to the 
rationalist point of view, where cost/beneﬁ t calculations are the main factors in the conditionality, 
determining the partners’ decision to cohere with the norms of the international organisation or 
refuse cooperation (Schimmelfennig & Knobel 2006).
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One central motivation for the member states and the EU institutions (especially the European 
Commission) during pre-accession was (as it is today) to safeguard and control the accession process. 
Fear that the possible enlargement could cause problems for the existing union, in ﬁ nancial or legal 
terms, played a key role in building the sophisticated accession conditionality in the 1990s. The 
CEE enlargement costs and risks were considered (by existing member states and EU institutions) 
to be so high that it was sometimes seen as a dilemma between the union’s enlargement and its 
internal eﬃ  ciency. At the time of pre-accession, the EU was shown as an altruistic actor putting 
its own existence at stake to re-unite Europe. Possible delays and unpredictable costs were seen as 
central components of enlargement risks. This approach worked very supportively for conditionality 
supporters, as it allowed to them to demand something in exchange from applicant countries for 
such a great risk taken by the EU. As applicant countries oﬀ ered all possible cooperation, the risk of 
possible failure of enlargement was not considered in oﬃ  cial assessments and reports.
Among the member states, motivation was diﬀ erent. Some of them were interested in fast 
enlargement (UK); others tried to postpone it (Greece, Spain and Portugal); the third group was 
interested in controlled accession (France and Benelux), where the pre-accession conditionality would 
provide them with better access to new resources and markets; the fourth group (Austria, Finland and 
Sweden) was interested in legal and historical justice. During the accession period, the motivation 
of those groups also changed and diverged, but oﬃ  cially the transparent and functional accession 
process still remained the only purpose of the accession criteria (Germany, in diﬀ erent pre-accession 
periods, covered most of the mentioned positions: ﬁ rst being motivated by idealistic historical 
justice reasoning and ending ﬁ nally with a pure proﬁ t-motivated approach, where advantages based 
on political inﬂ uence and economic size were fully utilised). Most member states tended to follow 
realistic arguments and national interests, when designing the pre-accession assessment system 
based on the principle that economic and political gains of accession were important only as long 
as these did not threaten the states’ sovereignty or statehood (Moravcsik 1999: 35-38). Accordingly, 
there was some fear of a zero-sum game among existing member states, based on the logic that for 
every winner, there must be a loser. The strongest idealistic and ethical arguments were used by 
Germany at the beginning of the formulation of the Copenhagen Criteria, but were abandoned as 
neither the other member states nor the applicants appreciated the German approach, but supported 
faster accession with more asymmetrical conditions.
It is also evident that the accession interests of separate institutions can be (and often are) dif-
ferent from the general long-term interest of the EU—accession has often become a vital component 
in the institutional competition between the Commission, Council and Parliament. In that situation, 
the possibility to delay accession by adjusting Progress Reports oﬀ ered needed additional time to the 
European Commission for institutional reform and a new ﬁ nancial approach package. A non-quan-
titative assessment methodology was needed to convince applicants that the reason for delay was 
their slowness in the reform process, not the EU’s unwillingness (Schimmelfennig & Sedelmeier 2002).
There were serious doubts whether democratic candidate states should share their legislative and 
executive power in an asymmetrical way as it was demanded during the pre-accession conditionality, 
even if it was a strategic goal for a nation, as it is implemented in a way that is in some aspects both 
anti-constitutional and anti-democratic. Final willingness to accept sovereignty sharing was justiﬁ ed 
by the idea of mutual interests and beneﬁ t. Integration is seen as a complete win-win game, where all 
the participants are at every stage certain that they will beneﬁ t through an additional deepening or 
widening of the integration process. But in such cases of asymmetry, at least the ﬁ nal result needs to 
indicate an actual beneﬁ t for both sides.
When combined together, this logic ﬁ tted well with a neo-institutionalist approach of the 
appropriateness of social processes, which is based on three components: rule following, habit, and 
rational choice from the morally acceptable options. The norms and formal rules of institutions will 
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shape the actions of those acting within them. “Compliance occurs in many circumstances because 
other types of behaviour are inconceivable; routines are followed because they are taken for granted 
as ‘the way we do these things’” (Scott 2001: 57).
To summarise: the creation of an assessment system and conditionality can be dominated by 
three main groups (all on the imposers’ side): net payers, non-gainers, and separate institutions (i.e. 
the European Commission). In rare cases, conditionality can be without a clear dominant side or 
dominated by applicant states. In certain areas, the criteria and the conditionality are supported by 
the representation of special interests of existing member states via giving special status to some 
applicant countries over others (Sjursen 2002). Preferences were caused by economic interests and 
political arguments/preferences; in both cases, the oﬃ  cial accession criteria only play a secondary 
role and the conditionality must guide the applicant countries to their place in the union.
Comparison of candidate countries’ progress reports: European Union versus 
independent evaluators
The governance eﬃ  ciency
The governance eﬃ  ciency criteria indicate the level of democracy, the stability of institutions and 
the respect of minority rights (based on the ﬁ rst Copenhagen Criteria and on some aspects the third 
Copenhagen Criteria)1. Governance eﬃ  ciency criteria are next to European Commission regularly 
evaluated by the World Bank, the Bertelsmann Foundation and Freedom House.
The main sub-components for the European Commission’s assessment are the administrative 
capacity of the public sector, the competence of the civil service, the regional administration capacity, 
the integrity of public interests and the ability to conduct reforms in the public sector. The European 
Commission assessment is published in the annual Progress Reports for all the applicant states. 
Governments’ eﬃ  ciency criteria in the cases of FYROM and Croatia also consist of a non-treaty add-
on stating: “It also monitors regional cooperation, good neighbourly relations and the respect for 
international obligations, such as cooperation with the UN International Criminal Tribunal for the 
former Yugoslavia” (European Commission 2006b: 6).
In the Commission’s evaluation, no quantitative categories are used; also no levels of progress are 
indicated. A central measurable aspect is that the Commission found some countries (Bulgaria and 
Romania) to have a suﬃ  cient level for accession and other countries required continuing reforms and 
eﬀ orts. Accordingly, on the scoreboard Bulgaria and Romania, which were ready for accession, were 
in the lead over Croatia and FYROM.
The main evaluative categories of the European Commission are: ‘the country has achieved 
success’, ‘the country is developing’, ‘the country has several challenges’, ‘limited progress’, ‘reforms 
need to be faster’. The ﬁ rst two (positive categories) have been used to describe the progress in 
Bulgaria and Romania (European Commission 2006a: 5 and European Commission 2006d: 5) and 
the remaining three negative categories to describe Croatian and FYROM developments (European 
Commission 2006c: 6 and European Commission 2006b: 7).
Independent qualitative evaluators oﬀ ered indexed evaluation, enabling us to see the diﬀ erence 
in percentages. Based on the 2004–2006 reports, Croatia could be considered as the best performer 
with an almost 10% advantage over Bulgaria. FYROM is ranked in the last position by all evaluators. 
Summarising the governments’ eﬃ  ciency indices from the World Bank, Freedom House and the 
Bertelsmann Foundation in the period of 2004–2006, Croatia scores the highest average in every year, 
whereas Bulgaria achieves second place, Romania third and FYROM fourth. Table 1 oﬀ ers an example 
of the evaluation of the impartial evaluator (World Bank 2006).
1 Evaluations on government eﬃ  ciency can be found under chapters 2.1, 2.2, 5 and 22 in the Progress Reports.
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Table 2 indicates that the diﬀ erence between the Commission’s assessment and the index-based 
assessments is the smallest in terms of Bulgarian and FYROM progress, and the Commission supported 
both by a 0.5 position. Romania gained a respectable 1.5 position support, and Croatia is the most 
discriminated. While being at the top of the independent scoreboards, Croatia shares the worst result 
with FYROM in European Commission Progress Reports.23
Existence and quality of the rule of law
The rule of law indicates the level of judicial process, the competence of judges, the possibility of 
disputes, non-discrimination in the judicial process and the eﬃ  ciency of the police (based on the 
1st Copenhagen Criteria and in some aspects the 3rd Copenhagen Criteria)4. Subcomponents for the 
European Commission assessments are: treatment of minorities, treatment of prisoners, gender 
equality, protection of children’s rights and treatment of handicapped people. In this category, the EU 
is quite critical of all four applicants and fully positive categories are avoided. The main problems are 
seen in areas of the witness protection, integrity of the legal system, prisoner treatment, impartiality 
of the legal system, lack of reforms in the judicial system, etc. (European Commission 2006a: 7, 
European Commission 2006b: 8 and European Commission 2006c; 10). 
The European Commission’s Progress Reports use the following categories for evaluation: ‘signiﬁ -
cant progress’ (Romania), ‘partial success and necessity of further progress’ (Bulgaria), ‘long way to 
transparent and eﬃ  cient rule of law’, ‘limited changes and progress’ (Croatia), ‘important challenges 
needed to create an eﬀ ective reform program’, and ‘Parliament has so far failed to enact new rules’ 
(FYROM) (Commission 2006a: 7; European Commission 2006b: 8 and European Commission 2006c: 10). 
Also as a rare example, some measurable facts were oﬀ ered as an example: ‘The European Court of 
Human Rights (ECtHR) delivered 25 judgements concerning Croatia’ (European Commission 2006b: 9).
Accordingly, the European Commission assessment indicates that Romania has the highest 
develop ment, Bulgaria is in second place, Croatia is ranked third and FYROM last in this comparison. 
In their conclusions, the European Commission also indicated that Bulgaria and Romania have a 
positive membership perspective, but Croatia and FYROM required deeper reforms.
2 Based on data presented by the European Commission in 2006 Country Reports.
3 Based on the data of independent evaluators.
4 The Commission’s evaluations are located under chapter 2.1 in the Progress Reports.
Table 1: World Bank evaluation on governance eﬃ  ciency 2004–2006 on a 100-point scale
2004 2005 2006
Bulgaria 60.7 61.6 58.3
Croatia 71.1 69.7 70.1
FYROM 54.5 45.5 52.1
Romania 57.3 56.9 57.8
Source: Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/, World 
Bank 2006
Table 2: Governance eﬃ  ciency 2004–2006: European Commission versus independent evaluators
Country EU ranking2 Index-based ranking3 Diﬀ erence 
Bulgaria 1–2 2 +0.5 positions
Croatia 3–4 1 -3.5 positions
FYROM 3–4 4 +0.5 positions
Romania 1–2 3 +1.5 positions
Source: European Commission 2006a; 2006b, 2006c, 2006d)
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Next to the EC, the existence and quality of the rule of law is regularly evaluated by the World 
Bank, the Bertelsmann Foundation and Freedom House. Independent evaluators included similar 
subcomponents for comparison, adding also the transparency aspects and level of bureaucracy. 
Combining all indices in this regard, Bulgaria was ranked at the top, but was seen to have structural 
problems. Romania and Croatia, while not having any speciﬁ c critique, were placed in equal 2nd and 3rd 
places, and FYROM is ranked last since it had several problems with its prison system, police, religious 
discrimination and recruitment principles. The best score in all the reference years and evaluators 
was achieved by Bulgaria, followed by Romania in 2nd and Croatia in 3rd place. FYROM was ranked last 
by all the evaluators during all those reference years. But the diﬀ erences are only by one point on the 
10-point scale.
The diﬀ erence between the European Commission’s assessment and the index-based assessments 
is very small. Croatia and FYROM have achieved similar positions, Bulgaria has an advantage of one 
position and Romania has lost a place when compared with independent index-based results.
Level of corruption and eﬃ  ciency of anti-corruption activities
The level of corruption and the eﬃ  ciency of anti-corruption activities (based on the 1st Copenhagen 
Criteria) indicate the general environment for the residents and the investors in terms of corruption 
and the government’s eﬀ orts and success in ﬁ ghting corruption, as well as the rules of public 
procurement. The level of corruption and eﬃ  ciency of anti-corruption activities are regularly evaluated 
by the European Commission5, the World Bank, the Bertelsmann Foundation, Transparency Inter-
national and Freedom House.
The main subcomponents for the European Commission assessment are: the judicial framework 
for anti-corruption activities, the existence of the necessary institutional structure and experts and 
public interest for implementation. The main evaluative categories for the European Commission and 
independent evaluators are overlapping: the level of corruption cases on the top level (politicians) and 
low level (education and medicine), cost of corruption for society, acceptance of corruption in society.
The European Commission assessment published in annual Progress Reports uses in this category 
no qualitative measuring. Evaluative categories are as follows: ‘proof of high level ﬁ ght against 
corruption’ (Bulgaria), ‘showing progress’ (Romania), ‘situation is serious and critical’, ‘measures have 
5 Located under chapters 5, 4.4 and 4.5 in the Progress Reports.
Table 3: Quality of the rule of law according to the Bertelsmann Foundation
Bulgaria Croatia FYROM Romania
2003–2004 7.8 8.3 7.0 7.3
2005–2006 8.5 8.0 6.8 8.3
Source: Bertelsmann Foundation report 2006 
Table 4: Rule of law 2004–2006: European Commission versus independent evaluators
Country EU ranking Index-based ranking Diﬀ erence 
Bulgaria 1–2 1 -1 position
Croatia 3 3 No diﬀ erence
FYROM 4 4 No diﬀ erence
Romania 1–2 1 +1 position
Source: European Commission 2006, Bertelsmann Foundation 2006, Freedom House 2006 and World 
Bank 2006 
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been taken’; however, ‘corruption remains a serious problem’ (Croatia), ‘corruption is widespread’, 
‘low political will to ﬁ ght corruption’ (FYROM). The EU Progress Report is most positive for Bulgaria, 
slightly positive for Romania, Croatia is evaluated as having serious problems in the ﬁ ght against 
corruption, and FYROM is in the worst situation, having low political interest in anti-corruption 
activities (European Commission 2006a: 8; European Commission 2006d: 8; European Commission 
2006b: 8; European Commission 2006c: 12). In the Croatian case, the Commission points to the crucial 
importance of the negative evaluation: “Progress on tackling corruption will also be an important 
indicator of Croatia’s readiness for eventual membership” (European Commission 2006b: 9). 
Independent index-based evaluators ﬁ nd that the level of the anti-corruption ﬁ ght is highest 
in Bulgaria (highest by the Freedom House index) and Croatia (highest by WB). The Bertelsmann 
Foundation and Transparency International ﬁ nd the level to be equal. Romania is clearly seen in third 
place and FYROM is in a league of its own (average results 15-20% lower than Romania’s results).
The comparison indicates that the European Commission reached the same conclusion as the 
independent evaluators in terms of FYROM (last place) and by Bulgaria, being in ﬁ rst and second 
places. The diﬀ erence with the independent evaluators appears in terms of Romania and Croatia. 
Romania, which according to the independent evaluators is seen clearly in third place, is in a positive 
light and in second place in the European Commission’s Progress Report. Croatia, on the other hand, 
has been downgraded 1.5 positions by the European Commission, while ranked as one of the best 
by the independent evaluators. It is seen as far behind Bulgaria and Romania in the Commission’s 
Progress Report. The Commission’s negative attitude towards Croatia also appears in the year-to-
year evaluation: where the Progress Report in 2006 points out that the level of corruption is growing 
compared to its previous level (European Commission 2006b: 52), other evaluators see the situation as 
improving. For example, Transparency International states the Corruption Perception Index in Croatia 
is improving from 3.4 to 4.1 on a 10-point scale. While the European Commission’s Progress Reports 
assess the four applicants as positive/progressive (Bulgaria and Romania) and negative (Croatia and 
FYROM) groups, independent evaluators are more critical and divide the groups in a way that Bulgaria, 
Croatia and Romania are more similar (having serious problems but showing the will to reform) and 
FYROM is far behind demonstrating a lack of will for reforms in this area.
Table 5: Transparency International rating on corruption 2004–2006
2004 2005 2006
Bulgaria 4.0 4.0 4.1
Croatia 3.4 3.4 4.1
FYROM 2.7 2.7 3.7
Romania 3.0 3.1 3.3
Source: Transparency International 2006, http://www.transparency.org/
Table 6: Anti-corruption activities 2004–2006: EU Commission versus independent evaluators
EU ranking Index-based ranking Diﬀ erence 
Bulgaria 1 1–2 +0.5 position
Croatia 3 1–2 -1.5 positions
FYROM 4 4 No diﬀ erence
Romania 2 3 +1 position
Source: European Commission 2006, Bertelsmann Foundation 2006, Freedom House 2006 and World 
Bank 2006
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Eﬃ  ciency of the legal system
The legal system’s eﬃ  ciency indicates the level of speed and transparency of legal procedures, disputes, 
property protection and the level of competition laws, (third Copenhagen Criteria)6. The eﬃ  ciency of 
the legal system is regularly evaluated by the World Bank, the Bertelsmann Foundation and Fraser 
Institute, to be used in the following comparison.
The main subcomponents for the European Commission’s assessments and other evaluators 
overlap: eﬃ  ciency in the ﬁ ght against cartels, intellectual and industrial property rights and eﬃ  ciency 
in property disputes.
The main evaluative categories of the European Commission state: remarkable progress´ (Bulgaria, 
Romania), ‘partial success’, ‘eﬀ orts have been made’, ‘special attention is needed’, ‘lack of success in 
several aspects’, and ‘budget remains insuﬃ  cient’ (Croatia and FYROM). No quantitative categories 
are used; also no levels of progress are indicated. A central measurable aspect is that the Commission 
found some countries to have a suﬃ  cient progress level concerning some chapters (competition law) 
for accession (Bulgaria and Romania) and some countries ‘needing continuing reforms and eﬀ orts’ 
(Croatia and FYROM). Accordingly, on the scoreboard Bulgaria and Romania are ranked higher than 
Croatia and FYROM (European Commission 2006a: 21; European Commission 2006d: 21, European 
Commission 2006b: 20 and European Commission 2006c: 24).
The problems of applicants are not seen in Community legislation harmonisation, but in terms 
of practical implementation and eﬃ  ciency (European Commission 2006e). In the cases of Croatia 
and FYROM, they are seen as not yet ready for accession: ‘There has been some progress in the 
area; however, a number of important challenges still remain’, and ‘substantial eﬀ orts will still be 
required overall’ (European Commission 2006c: 55). When comparing the two successful (Romania 
and Bulgaria) and the two unsuccessful (Croatia and FYROM) applicants, then Bulgaria receives 
more positive comments than Romania, and Croatia is seen as the worst even compared to FYROM. 
Croatia receives a most negative comment in this aspect: ‘The judicial system has continued to suﬀ er 
from slow and ineﬃ  cient court proceedings, poor case management and low administrative and 
professional capacity’ (European Commission 2006b: 31). The following Table 7 oﬀ ers an example of 
evaluation by an impartial evaluator (World Bank 2006).
Summarising the legal system’s eﬃ  ciency indices from the World Bank, Fraser Institute and the 
Bertelsmann Foundation in the period of 2004–2006: Bulgaria is seen as the best performer in the ﬁ eld, 
followed by Croatia and Romania. The average diﬀ erences are small (less than 3%) and, for example, 
the Fraser Institute ranks Croatia in ﬁ rst place and Bulgaria only in third place. FYROM is ranked as 
last by all evaluators. Independent evaluators also evaluate the reform progress dynamics in this ﬁ eld 
diﬀ erently. FYROM is seen showing the best progress, while Bulgaria and Croatia are seen stagnating 
throughout the period.
A comparison indicates that the European Commission reached the same conclusion with other 
evaluators in terms of Bulgaria being the best. FYROM and Romania both received one position 
advantage in the Progress Report, while Croatia received -2 positions’ discrimination.
Economic liberties and freedoms
Economic liberties and freedoms indicate the level of market accessibility, market safeguarding 
eﬃ  ciency, the market accessibility of other EU residents, acceptance of EU qualiﬁ cations and standards, 
and limits of bank procedures (a concern of the 2nd Copenhagen Criteria)7. The main subcomponents 
for the European Commission’s assessment and other evaluators cover: the simplicity of starting 
up and closing down companies/enterprises, access to the labour market, limits for non-national 
6 Commission evaluations can be found under chapters 3.1, 4.3 and 4.4 in the Progress Reports.
7 Evaluations are located under chapters 3.1, 4.3 and 4.4 in the Progress Reports.
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residents, accessibility of foreign investment instruments, conditions for real estate ownership 
for foreigners, measures to stop money laundering, intellectual property law, and development of 
corporate legislation. There are some diﬀ erences in the composition of speciﬁ c sub-components of 
diﬀ erent evaluators, but the majority of components overlap. The most detailed is the Fraser Institute’s 
research, while the Heritage Foundation oﬀ ers a composite index, and the Bertelsmann Foundation’s 
report is the most comprehensive.
The European Commission’s assessment is published in annual Progress Reports. The main 
evaluative categories are ‘absence of suﬃ  cient progress’, ‘urgent need for additional eﬀ orts’ (both 
FYROM); ‘limited progress’ and ‘partial success’ (Croatia), and ‘remarkable progress’ (Bulgaria). No 
quantitative categories are used; also no levels of progress are indicated. None of the applicants have 
been able to close this chapter in negotiations with the EU in time for the Progress Report being issued 
(European Commission 2006a: 15-20; European Commission 2006b: 27-30; European Commission 
2006c: 26; European Commission 2006d: 26).
In general, progress Reports are critical and oﬀ er recommendations as well as guidelines to 
all candidate states. The Commission is critical of all applicant countries concerning anti-money 
laundering activities and credit market regulations. 
The European Commission is most critical of FYROM’s lack of results and demands further eﬀ orts. 
Critics of Croatia’s progress are softer and partial progress is acknowledged, but it is not combined 
with a positive evaluation: ‘no progress can be reported’ and ‘continued eﬀ orts needed’. In Croatia’s 
case, it is again highlighted that the lack of progress is a possible obstacle for accession: “Legislation 
in the area of the ﬁ ght against money laundering needs further alignment and administrative 
and enforcement capacity should be strengthened. Increased eﬀ orts will be needed to meet the 
requirements of this chapter.” Romania partially receives a positive assessment (but the fewest 
number of comments in this area), while Bulgarian progress is seen as remarkable in several sub-areas 
of economic liberties and freedoms. Accordingly on the scoreboard, Bulgaria is in ﬁ rst place, followed 
by Romania, Croatia and FYROM (European Commission 2006a: 15-20; European Commission 2006b: 
27-30; European Commission 2006c: 26; European Commission 2006d: 26).
Table 7: World Bank evaluation on judicial eﬃ  ciency 2004–2006, 100-point scale (100 is the most 
eﬃ  cient)
2004 2005 2006
Bulgaria 72.7 69.8 66.8
Croatia 68.6 65.4 63.4
FYROM 53.2 50.7 54.1
Romania 60.5 58.5 64.9
Source: Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/; World 
Bank 2006
Table 8: Legal system eﬃ  ciency 2004–2006: European Commission versus independent evaluators
EU ranking Index-based ranking Diﬀ erence 
Bulgaria 1 1 No diﬀ erence
Croatia 4 2 -2 positions
FYROM 3 4 +1 position
Romania 2 3 +1 position
Source: European Commission 2006, Bertelsmann Foundation 2006, Fraser Institute 2006 and World 
Bank 2006 
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Based on the calculated average of the Heritage Foundation, Fraser Institute and the Bertelsmann 
Foundation’s assessments during the period of 2004–2006, Bulgaria and Croatia are the two best 
performers with the same average; Romania is third and close behind. FYROM is in fourth place, but 
the diﬀ erence is similar to the diﬀ erence between the ﬁ rst two and Romania. The average diﬀ erences 
are small, less than 2% (see Table 9 as an example).
Assessments of Croatia’s progress are the most controversial, since the quantitative results and 
index values are high, but at the same time Croatia receives the highest number of critical comments. 
Romania, at the same time, receives lower index values but also fewer critical comments (both from 
independent evaluators and from the Commission).
The comparison indicates that the European Commission arrives at the same conclusion as the 
other evaluators in terms of FYROM’s progress. Bulgaria receives a half position advantage; Romania 
gains an advantage of one position, while Croatia loses 1.5 positions.
Similarities and diﬀ erences between the European Commission and independent 
evaluators
To answer the main research question, ‘What were the main motivators of the EU evaluation system’s 
design and what was its actual inﬂ uence in practice during the 2004-2006 pre-accession assessments?’, 
there is a need to ﬁ rst specify the scope and nature of diﬀ erences between the European Commission’s 
rankings and the rankings of other respected evaluators. If systematic and inﬂ uential diﬀ erences 
appear, the next task will be to analyse the opportunities and motivation of the Commission for 
adjustments in the Progress Reports.
The logical starting point of the analysis was that if the European Commission and other inter-
national institutions were in their best ways, objectively and impartially evaluating candidate countries 
by using the same criteria and statistical data, they should in general receive a similar result. Or if the 
results diﬀ ered slightly, it was not systematic and in general purposely discriminatory against any of 
the candidate states. 
Table 9: Bertelsmann Foundation’s evaluation on economic liberties on a 100-point scale
2004
2005 and 2006 
summarised
Change
Bulgaria 83.3 86.6 +3.3
Croatia 86.6 83.3 -3.3
FYROM 64.4 72.2 +7.8
Romania 77.7 83.3 +5.6
Source: Bertelsmann Foundation Report 2007 
Table 10: Economic liberties 2004–2006: European Commission versus independent evaluators’ average
EU ranking Index-based ranking Diﬀ erence 
Bulgaria 1 1–2 +0.5 positions 
Croatia 3 1–2 -1.5 positions
Macedonia 4 4 No diﬀ erence
Romania 2 3 +1 position
Source: European Commission 2006, Bertelsmann Foundation 2006, Fraser Institute 2006 and Heritage 
Foundation 2006
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The following analysis (see also Table 11) summarises which countries have received an advantage 
or been discriminated against on the scoreboard ranking from the European Commission when 
compared with the average of other evaluators. It is also an important question whether those 
advantages and discriminations actually play a role in the selection process. 
The analysis indicates two types of results concerning diﬀ erences of assessments. The Commission’s 
evaluations of Bulgaria and FYROM in 2004-2006 show minimal diﬀ erences from the independent 
evaluators, as the diﬀ erence is only 0.1 positions in both cases. This can be considered an almost ideal 
overlapping result and proof that the methodology of diﬀ erent evaluators is comparable.
In comparison, the assessments of Croatia and Romania show a remarkably higher diﬀ erence 
between European Commission assessment results and the average of other evaluators. In the 
Romanian case, the average diﬀ erence is positive by 1.1 positions and in the Croatian case the 
diﬀ erence is negative by 1.7 positions. There is also a need to take into account that in the comparison 
of four states, the maximum diﬀ erence can be three positions. The second important aspect is that all 
diﬀ erences in both cases are non-balanced: in all cases where the diﬀ erence of positions appears, it 
appears in the way that Romania is being given a comparative advantage and Croatia a disadvantage.
Table 11: Comparative rankings of European Commission Progress Reports and independent evaluators
Bulgaria Croatia FYROM Romania
Governance eﬃ  ciency (European Commission) 1–2 3–4 3–4 1–2
Governance eﬃ  ciency (Neutral evaluators) 2 1 4 3
Position advantage by Commission Report +0.5 –3.5 +0.5 +1.5
Rule of law (European Commission) 2 3 4 2
Rule of law (Neutral evaluators) 2 3 4 1
Position advantage by Commission Report -1 0 0 +1
Anti-corruption activities (European Commission) 1 3 4 2
Anti-corruption activities (Neutral evaluators) 1–2 1–2 4 3
Position advantage by Commission Report -0.5 -1.5 0 +1
Eﬃ  ciency of legal system (European Commission) 1 4 3 2
Eﬃ  ciency of legal system (Neutral evaluators) 1 2 4 3
Position advantage by Commission Report 0 -2 +1 +1
Economic liberties (European Commission) 1 3 4 2
Economic liberties (Neutral evaluators) 1–2 1–2 4 3
Position advantage by Commission Report +0.5 -1.5 0 +1
Summarised position advantage given by 
Commission Reports
 0.5 -8.5 0.5 5.5
Average position advantage given by Commission 
Reports
-0.1 -1.7 0.1 1.1
Average rank by the EC 1.3 3.3 3.7 1.9
Average rank by independent evaluators 1.6 1.8 4 2.6
Source: European Commission 2006, Bertelsmann Foundation 2006, Fraser Institute 2006 and Heritage 
Foundation 2006.
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The Commission Report shows Bulgaria and Romania (average positions in the Commission 
ranking: 1.3 and 1.9) as one group, which is clearly more progressive and worthy of accession, while 
putting Croatia in the same boat as FYROM (average positions in the Commission ranking 3.3 and 3.7). 
When looking at the independent evaluators’ side, which is based on a comparison of the index-
based data, the results are diﬀ erent. Croatia scores the best result and seems to be the most prepared 
for membership. Bulgaria receives the second result and is also seen as ready for accession. Romania 
and FYROM are clearly left behind, as not having suﬃ  cient social and administrative progress.
As a result, European Commission assessments have exchanged the Croatian and Romanian 
positions in question regarding which of them deserves the accession invitation. Clariﬁ cation of the 
motivation for this exchange is even more important when considering that the actual accession 
selection was mainly about the evaluation of Romania and Croatia, and as a result Croatia was left out 
and Romania was accepted for the 2007 accession round (this decision was justiﬁ ed with the Progress 
Report results).
The main motivators of the EU assessment system 2004-2006
Parallel to the long-term organisational needs of the EU to use the assessment system to reﬂ ect actual 
progress in the candidate states and motivate them for further progress, practical circumstances and 
political pressure may have played an important role in the assessments of Bulgaria, Croatia, FYROM 
and Romania. 
Contrary to the original 5th enlargement round, where both Bulgaria and Romania participated 
with eight other CEE states, Malta and Cyprus, in the period of 2004-2006 candidate states with 
diﬀ erent accession perspectives were included in one assessment procedure. Bulgaria and Romania 
were the rejected countries from the original 5th enlargement group, having had long and complicated 
accession talks, both having high social expectations of being accepted for membership, and both 
putting heavy political pressure on the EU to be accepted as soon as possible. Even when seen as quite 
similar by EU public opinion, the socio-economic development and harmonisation has been quite 
diﬀ erent for those two countries. Bulgaria, according to neutral evaluators, was quite progressive 
and more or less acceptable for membership in most of the evaluations, while Romania, on the other 
hand, had diﬃ  culties in several areas with fulﬁ lling the Copenhagen Criteria. 
According to independent evaluations—Bulgaria was already ready for accession in 2004 and 
Romania’s progress ﬂ uctuated even in 2006—these two countries should have been treated diﬀ erently. 
In this situation, the political and geographical aspects started to become dominant—in terms of 
practical policy implementations and public support, it became quite uncomfortable for the EU to 
reject Romania while Bulgaria was accepted. After understanding the circumstances, the Romanian 
policymakers started to play even more on the emotional and political aspect rather than on showing 
actual progress in terms of the Copenhagen Criteria. Politically and administratively it seemed most 
rational to many other EU member states and EU policymakers to accept the two neighbouring 
countries together.
The need to evaluate Croatia with Bulgaria and Romania over the same period of time using the 
same criteria and assessment logic made the situation even more complicated for the EU. First, it 
made it more diﬃ  cult simply to conclude that this time both Romania and Bulgaria had met the 
criteria as Croatia served as a reference base, according to the results between Bulgaria and Romania 
in terms of fulﬁ lling the Copenhagen Criteria (according to the data of independent evaluators). This 
situation was even more complicated due to the wish of some member states and EU institutions to 
force Croatia to fulﬁ l some additional (non-Copenhagen Criteria) conditions before receiving positive 
assessments in terms of the pre-accession progress.
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According to the terms of the accession partnership, only progress in the Copenhagen Criteria 
is legally binding in the ﬁ nal decision. But as there was strong political and administrative pressure 
in the EU to accept both Bulgaria and Romania and not to accept Croatia, the starting point of 
the assessment was not neutral. On the other hand, as the Commission already had its favourites, 
adjustments to the Progress Report were mainly needed to justify political preferences and necessities 
(to accept Bulgaria and Romania and reject Croatia and FYROM). The Commission’s inﬂ uence over 
the accession selection is even more evident when considering that Romania was accepted for 
membership in 2006 (accession in 2007), but Croatia is still outside the EU in 2012—after six years of 
eﬀ orts with more progress still to be made with the Copenhagen Criteria.
Additionally, a general broader international image of Croatia being ‘the troublesome part of 
former Yugoslavi’ was used to prepare most of the audience emotionally to admit that Bulgaria and 
Romania were more suitable candidates than Croatia. Adding FYROM to the same assessment reports 
only supported this logic, as Croatia and FYROM were introduced as countries that had made similar 
socio-economic progress.
Adjustments in the assessment results were possible by broadening the criteria and losing the 
quantitative aspect, which was technically conducted by using the gap between the actual Copenhagen 
Criteria and a modiﬁ ed list of criteria used for the Progress Reports. Once the candidate states 
accepted that the Progress Report evaluates questions outside the original Copenhagen Criteria, every 
new Progress Report continued to raise additional ‘non-criteria’ questions. The European Commission 
even made it no secret that the Progress Reports were only partly based on the actual Copenhagen 
Criteria (for example, the ﬁ rst chapter of the FYROM Progress Reports states, “This section examines 
the progress made by the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia towards meeting the Copenhagen 
political criteria, which require stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, 
human rights and respect for and protection of minorities. It also monitors regional cooperation, 
good neighbourly relations and respect for international obligations, such as cooperation with the UN 
International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia” (European Commission 2006c: 5).
Candidate countries, while relying on objective criteria and trying to achieve positive feedback in 
the Progress Reports, trusted the EU fully (at least in their open statements), even when in some cases 
not clearly understanding the actual motivation of some requirements. The EU, of course, stated often 
that the only way to accession is the way through conditionality and fulﬁ lling all demands pointed 
out in the Progress Reports. “The pre-accession conditionality has in many aspects served as the best 
option to explain to candidate countries that they have a ‘take it or leave it’ situation. We just ask 
countries that are interested in participating in our structures to comply with our rules and to share 
our values” (Solana 2003).
This process found no counterarguments as the European Commission was the only oﬃ  cial 
evaluator, and candidate countries accepted the broadening of criteria. The use of qualitative measuring 
worked according to the same logic—as none of the participants demanded use of quantitatively 
measurable benchmarks, the European Commission continued the use of qualitative assessment 
methods. It can also be seen as a strategic choice of the EU to signal to the candidate countries that 
all the demands of the member states and institutions must be fulﬁ lled, even if these are not included 
in the Copenhagen Criteria. Otherwise, Progress Reports would not ﬁ nd suﬃ  cient progress in the 
criteria ﬁ eld, even when most of the other impartial evaluators do so.
The question What is right or legal? loses its importance when applicant countries have clearly 
accepted the whole set of accession measures. The model becomes an eﬀ ective conditionality factor 
as acceptance is needed only in the beginning, but transformation of conditionality can continue 
during the whole process. Applicant countries ﬁ nd themselves in a path-dependence model, where 
they have the options to continue the process or lose previous progress. As continuing to follow the 
path does not need any fundamental decisions, but cancellation does, the logical choice is to continue. 
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This created a conditionality situation, which was clearly asymmetrical and discriminatory 
towards candidate countries, providing a possibility of subjective treatment, without the possibility 
of impartial arbitrage. Basically, the candidate countries have found themselves in a situation where 
they had no options against the possible misuse of conditionality, which started to encourage the 
European Commission for political use of assessments as seen in cases tested in this paper. 
Conclusions
The creation of the Copenhagen Criteria and the evaluation system based on a wide range of sub-
criteria, regular assessments and a reward system has been seen as one of the success stories of the 
EU during the last 20 years. The original goal of the European Commission was to create a transparent 
and competitive environment for candidate states for the whole pre-accession period.
The aim of this paper was to analyse the motivation and actual purpose of the pre-accession 
assessment process in the examples of Bulgaria, Croatia, FYROM and Romania in the period of 
2004–2006. The practical case studies conducted in the research also provided some arguments with 
which to answer the question, Why did the EU need to create a separate assessment system instead of 
summarising the already existing reports of the OSCE, OECD, WB, IMF, the Bertelsmann Foundation, the 
Frazer Institute, the Heritage Foundation and Freedom House? and What inﬂ uence did it have on the actual 
accession process during the years 2004–2006?
This study was motivated by criticism in the end stage of the ﬁ fth enlargement both about the 
general conditionality logic and the practical assessment methods. First, the criteria were seen as 
too universal and idealistic. Second, the evaluation process itself was not transparent or measurable, 
causing some member states to fail (and complain), especially when these countries showed quite 
reasonable progress when evaluated by the IMF, WB or other impartial international evaluators. The 
possible existence of the so-called ‘hidden agenda’ and the importance of political support instead of 
actual progress in the criteria area were raised by candidate countries. After the hard treatment of 
Slovenia, the rejection of Bulgaria and Romania in 2003, and later evaluation problems with Croatia, 
the critique became more systematic.
The main ﬁ ndings proved the importance of the research question, as it was possible to locate 
ﬁ ve important accession criteria, which can be measured quantitatively, but where the European 
Commission prefers to use semi-quantitative assessments. As a result, EU assessments in these criteria 
oﬀ er a possibility for a subjective image of applicant countries. Third, the EU uses Progress Reports to 
inform applicant states that non-Copenhagen Criteria need to be fulﬁ lled as well, as results in oﬃ  cial 
criteria depend on the EU’s general political will and attitude towards the applicant state.
The research results also indicated the existence of two diﬀ erent evaluation methodologies in the 
EU pre-accession conditionality. The evaluation cases of Bulgaria and FYROM showed that the European 
Commission’s results almost fully overlap with those of independent evaluators—accordingly, the 
methodology and criteria components are suﬃ  ciently similar to be compared in other cases as well. 
In the cases of Croatia and Romania, the European Commission’s evaluation results of the EU diﬀ er 
signiﬁ cantly or systematically from the calculated average of the impartial evaluators
The diﬀ erence was both systematic and inﬂ uential, as it was changing the actual standings in 
the pre-accession scoreboard. The diﬀ erences also reﬂ ected the practical motivation of the European 
Commission and member states in the cases of Romania and Croatia, where the ﬁ rst needed to be 
accepted (due the practical interests of the European Commission and member states) and the second 
rejected despite the better results and actual progress in the areas of the Copenhagen Criteria. 
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Regular assessments and Progress Reports were not used only to select candidate countries 
and evaluate their progress, but also to justify political reality, which demanded the acceptance of 
Romania and Bulgaria and the rejection of Croatia despite actual progress in the Copenhagen Criteria.
The EU’s evaluation impartiality and transparency are also important topics ﬁ ve years later in 2012, 
as the European Commission announced that Croatia would not be ready for accession before 2013.
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